A second wave of cyberattack on supermarkets in France has heightened concerns as cyber attackers compromised the refrigeration systems, soaring the temperatures to as high as 50 degrees Celsius in November.
The incident comes right after last month where attackers seized control of cooling units in as many as 700 supermarkets causing fires and food losses that were estimated to be around tens of millions of euros.
In another incident, the attackers reportedly changed temperature settings on refrigeration equipment used by the French Blood Establishment, EFS, from around −30°C to 110°C. Although staff reportedly detected the changes in time and no operational consequences were reported, the incident highlighted the potential impact of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.
What happened?
In October 2026, over 700 retail and grocery stores primarily in France and a few neighbouring countries reported major disruptions in their refrigeration systems. None of the hardware, at least not physically was disrupted.
An unknown threat actor allegedly hacked into the equipment and forced refrigerators and freezers to remain in defrost mode preventing the systems from maintaining their required cooling temperatures. A second, smaller wave followed during the first week of November, using a similar approach.
No individual or group has claimed responsibility for either the first or the second wave of attacks. European authorities are currently investigating the attack.
The threat extends to medical refrigeration
The attacks became even more concerning in early November, when reports emerged of unauthorised changes to refrigeration equipment used for storing blood products in France. The attackers reportedly targeted a service provider responsible for supplying and maintaining the cooling equipment. The setpoints on frozen storage units were allegedly changed from approximately -30°C to 110°C.
Frozen plasma intended for transfusion must generally be stored at -25°C or below. If products remain outside their approved temperature range for too long, they may become unsuitable for medical use.
Fortunately, an on-call technician reportedly noticed the temperature changes during the night, allowing staff to respond. There have been no confirmed public reports of destroyed plasma, disrupted transfusions, or patient harm.
How did attackers gain access?
Researchers, including France's CERT, traced the attacks to Internet-connected refrigeration controllers manufactured by companies based in Denmark and Italy. Organizations using these controllers often connect them to the Internet to enable remote maintenance and support which could potentially expose them to unauthorized access and remote attack by threat actors.
Risks include unpatched vulnerabilities, weak configurations and poor security hygiene among other major problems:
1. Vulnerable and outdated software:
Security researchers had previously identified vulnerabilities in some of the controller platforms involved in the controllers. These included weaknesses that could potentially allow attackers to execute commands remotely or disrupt device availability.
Although patches were available for some vulnerabilities, applying them depended on individual customers and equipment operators.
2. Unsupported equipment:
Some affected controllers were reportedly older models that had reached the end of their support period. Certain devices had stopped receiving security updates years earlier.
3. Weak and reused passwords:
Default passwords, shared service credentials, and passwords reused across multiple locations can make it easier for attackers to access connected equipment. If the same credentials are used across hundreds of stores, compromising one account or discovering one password may expose several systems.
4. Management interfaces exposed to the Internet:
Many connected controllers have web-based management interfaces that allow authorised technicians to access their settings remotely. When these interfaces are directly accessible over the public Internet without adequate protection, attackers can discover them through automated scanning and attempt to exploit their weaknesses.
Why are connected devices becoming a bigger cybersecurity concern?
The refrigeration attacks reflect a broader challenge involving operational technology (OT) and the Internet of Things (IoT).
Operational technology includes the hardware and software used to monitor and control physical processes. This includes industrial machinery, refrigeration systems, manufacturing equipment, building management systems, and medical storage facilities.
IoT devices connect physical equipment to networks, allowing information to be collected, monitored, and managed remotely. While these technologies improve efficiency, they also introduce security challenges.
Unlike traditional IT systems, many operational devices are not designed around frequent software updates or regular security maintenance. They may operate continuously, use older software, and depend on third-party technicians for maintenance.
Another concern is the separation between IT and OT security. An organisation may have strong protections for its corporate network while overlooking the systems controlling its physical equipment.
What can organisations do to protect connected infrastructure?
Protecting connected equipment requires securing not just the physical device, but also the networks, applications, remote access methods, and people responsible for managing it. Some essential security measures include:
1. Restrict direct Internet access:
Management interfaces for industrial and refrigeration equipment should not be exposed directly to the public Internet. Remote access should use secure access mechanisms, strong authentication, and controlled permissions.
2. Replace default and shared credentials:
Every device and location should have unique credentials. Default passwords and shared vendor access codes should be replaced, while access should be limited to authorised personnel.
3. Maintain software and firmware updates:
Organisations should regularly review the software versions running on connected equipment and apply available security patches. Devices that no longer receive security updates should be included in a replacement plan.
4. Segment operational networks:
OT devices should operate on isolated network segments rather than sharing unrestricted access with corporate IT systems. Network segmentation helps contain a breach and prevents attackers from moving easily between connected environments.
5. Monitor configuration changes:
Changes to critical equipment settings should be logged and reviewed. Unexpected modifications to temperature limits, defrost schedules, access permissions, or operating parameters should trigger alerts.
6. Introduce independent monitoring:
Organisations should not rely entirely on the equipment's own controller to report problems. Independent temperature sensors and monitoring systems can help identify abnormal conditions, even if the primary controller has been compromised.
The bigger lesson: Physical infrastructure needs cybersecurity too
The European refrigeration attacks demonstrate how a digital compromise can quickly become a physical and operational problem. As organisations connect more infrastructure to the Internet, cybersecurity must extend beyond computers, servers, and corporate applications.
Refrigeration units, manufacturing equipment, medical storage systems, and building controls all play a role in keeping essential services running. Their security deserves the same attention as any other critical business system. Ultimately, protecting connected infrastructure means securing not just the data it handles, but also the physical processes it controls.